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From its enlightened past, the modern world inherited the moral imperative to reduce 
human suffering anywhere in the world, with violence and cruelty when necessary.
2
 To 
understand how compassion and violence, benevolence and cruelty could be intimately 
intertwined, one may study practices of European colonizing missions which enfolded the native 
violently, with an idealist benevolence to better her lot in the eyes of God or of History, 
understood, of course, progressively.
3
 Even in colonial wars of extermination, what Paul Gilroy 
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 See, among others, an important essay by the anthropologist Talal Asad, which argues that the 
heritage of the Enlightenment for the modern world is not merely the moral standard that 
universal suffering should be reduced, but also ‘a complex genealogy that is partly older than the 
eighteenth century in which compassion and benevolence are intertwined with violence and 
cruelty, an intertwining that is not merely a coexistence of the two but a mutual dependence of 
each on the other’. T Asad, ‘Reflections on Violence, Law and Humanitarianism’ 41(2) Critical 
Inquiry (2015) 393. For a history of humanitarianism from early 19
th
 century to the present day, 
see M Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Cornell UP, 2011).   
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 As Gayatri Spivak insists, the colonizers, too, were people with ‘good intentions’. G Spivak, 
Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Towards a History of the Vanishing Present (Harvard UP, 
1999) 371. Also see K Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal 
Imperialism (Princeton UP, 2010) for a demonstration of how the 19
th
 century turn to indirect 
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calls that ultimate colonial fantasy of a clean war infused violence with the high moral ground of 
humanity, of acting humanely in the name of civilization.4 In 1876, the notorious King Léopold 
II of Belgium’s bloody empire could claim about his colonial enterprise in Africa, for instance, 
that it was ‘charitable’ and ‘philanthropic’, and that it brought together ‘friends of humanity’ in 
order ‘to open to civilization the only part of the globe where it has not yet penetrated, to pierce 
the darkness enshrouding entire populations, that is, if I may venture to say so, a crusade worthy 
of this century of progress’. And ‘the current is with us’, King Léopold II would declare.5  
Has the current ever left them? As a contemporary iteration of that ultimate colonial 
fantasy of a clean war, consider the following statement by the political theorist Michael 
Ignatieff, as inflicted as it is with the theological themes of mercy, benevolence, and the threat of 
a guilty conscience—all of which belong to the Christian just war tradition. In an article penned 
a few weeks after 11 September 2001, Ignatieff claimed:  
We owe them [terrorists] nothing other than the mercy that all human life has a right to 
claim. But we owe ourselves much more. … The obligations we owe are to ourselves 
alone, to the moral identity that gives justice to the cause. The combatants who will wage 
this war in our name will have to live with what they do. To execute the innocent, to visit 
death on civilians, even to torture the guilty, would haunt those who serve in our name. 
For that reason alone, a war against terror must be discriminate, proportional and 
restrained.6 
                                                                                                                                                             
rule in British India went along with the benevolent desire to defend ‘native culture’ from the 
disruptive effects of modernity.  
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 P Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia (Columbia UP, 2005) 43.  
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 M Ignatieff, ‘It’s war - but it doesn’t have to be dirty’, The Guardian, 1 October 2001, available 
at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/01/afghanistan.terrorism9 (last visited 3 
November 2016). Thanks to Paul Gilroy for drawing attention to this article by Ignatieff. For a 
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Nevertheless, Ignatieff and other liberal-minded ‘friends of humanity’ cannot quite explain why 
it may be more acceptable to execute terrorists than to torture them cruelly. In either case, the 
terrorist appears as a gangrene to be cut off compassionately in order to improve the life of 
humankind as such.   
It would be a mistake to dismiss such benevolent calls to violence for improving the life 
of humanity as mere ‘rhetoric’. Instead, compassionate calls to arms—whether military 
interventions demanded, left and right, in the name of humanity or the endorsement of humane 
kinds of violence by human rights advocates, always discriminate, proportional, and timely—
demonstrate how benevolence and violence can mutually depend on each other.7 We could 
remember that like the gas chamber that kills bloodless, the guillotine as well was a humane 
invention designed to kill in the name of a revolutionary humanity.8 After all, revolutionary love 
too can embrace violence benevolently (and vice versa). Essentially, it is in the context of this 
complex genealogy where compassion and violence feed on each other that I think we must 
reflect on the politics of humanity, and explore why—and with which consequences—
internationalists and cosmopolitans alike champion it.  
With concerns that emanate from this context, in Part I, ‘The Right to Be a Human 
Being’, I begin the essay by examining how two contemporaries, Malcolm X and Hannah Arendt, 
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 See M Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison (Penguin Books, 1991) [1997] 
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approached the question of human rights to reflect on the ways in which they challenge liberal 
formulations of rights that allegedly belong to all human beings by the mere fact of their birth. I 
argue that when liberal philosophies of human rights inscribe particular qualities to human 
beings (be it agency, autonomy, rationality, or whichever other quality is thought to differentiate 
humans from non-humans), they construct the human as potentially autonomous, developed, 
capable, rational, civilized, and therefore potentially entitled to and capable of enjoying human 
rights.  
In Part II, ‘The Essence of Humanity’, contrary to common interpretations based on the 
concept of exclusion, I further develop my argument that the establishment of hierarchies 
amongst subjects with different entitlements to enjoy the human prerogative has also been 
facilitated by their categorical inclusion in the order of humanity—specifically, within an 
evolutionary framework that recognizes their potential to become proper humans. I conclude the 
article in Part III, ‘Taking the Risk of Humanity’, by questioning the desire for humanity as a 
collective subject. If, as I argue, violence is central, and hierarchy is intrinsic to the political and 
ethical operations of ‘humanity’—why should the grounds of our acting together, with or without 
borders, be given by this concept? Considering the systematic nature of methods by which 
equality has been denied to certain human beings whose humanity, as membership in a species, 
has nevertheless been granted, I ask, what accounts for the faith that as concept, ideal, or practice, 
a humanity that does not discriminate amongst its ranks is possible? 
 
Part I 
The Right to Be a Human Being  
 5 
On 28 June 1964, on the occasion of the Organization of Afro-American Unity’s 
constitution in Harlem, Malcolm X, now in the last year of his life, declared a few rights, which 
were rights, he said, to be brought into existence—by any means necessary. 
 
We declare our right on this earth to be a man, to be a human being, to be respected as a 
human being, to be given the rights of a human being in this society, on this earth, in this 
day, which we intend to bring into existence by any means necessary.9 
 
What is striking about this declaration is first and foremost the finding that man is not already 
man (not to mention woman10), that certain human beings are not already human beings. This is 
why Malcolm X finds it necessary to first speak of a right to be a man, of a right to be a human 
being, and only then of a right to be respected as a human being.11 In this conception, being 
human is a status to be brought into existence one way or another, but significantly, the human 
status cannot be established by the naked fact of birth.  
Next comes an equally striking right, the right to be given the rights of a human being. 
Despite their similarity at first glance, this particular right Malcolm X articulates necessitates a 
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 M X, By Any Means Necessary: Speeches, Interviews, and a Letter by Malcolm X (Pathfinder 
Press, 1970) 56. 
10
 Of course, it is not merely a coincidence that Malcolm X speaks first of a ‘right to be a man’ 
and then of a ‘right to be a human being’. In addition to Malcolm X’s own masculinist 
tendencies, moreover, consider Wendy Brown’s argument that the ‘liberal discourse of generic 
personhood reinscribe[s] rather than emancipate[s] us from male dominance’. W Brown, States 
of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton UP, 1995) 141. 
11
 With his formulation of a right to be a human being, Malcolm X may also be stressing the 
importance of particular forms of social behavior (acting with humanity). The fact that ‘humanity’ 
has this second sense of acting with kindness allows its meaning in discourse to slide from the 
one to the other. It seems to me that Malcolm X’s notion of ‘the right to be respected as a human 
being’, which follows the ‘right to be a human being’, encapsulates better the socio-behavioral 
sense of ‘humanity’, as in acting kindly.  
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politics quite different from Hannah Arendt’s notion of the right to have rights.12 When Arendt 
wrote about the right to have rights—also in New York City, some ten years before Malcolm 
X—what she had in mind was the right to belong to a bounded political community, the right to 
legal membership in a particular polity. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Arendt would 
observe not only how the loss of ‘national rights’ always entailed the loss of human rights, but 
also how ‘the restoration of human rights, as the recent example of the State of Israel proves, has 
been achieved only through the restoration or the establishment of national rights’.13 More 
precisely then, what Arendt had in mind with her ‘right to have rights’ was citizenship (or 
‘nationality’14 in the language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and many a visa 
application today), the right to be a citizen of a state, which was the only practicable way, Arendt 
insisted, to enjoy human rights as civil rights protected by one’s own state.  
For Malcolm X, on the other hand, precisely the fact that Afro-Americans were citizens 
of the United States and thus subject to its racist rule of law was what prevented them from 
enjoying human rights. This is why Malcolm X found it necessary to situate his friends as well as 
his enemies within a global community that went beyond the United States into a transnational 
community of ‘humanity’. But to be a member of this humanity, one still had to have, first and 
foremost, the right to be a human being, which was a ‘right’ that Malcolm X could take for 
granted neither in theory, nor in practice.  
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What is more, when he declared on behalf of the Organization of Afro-American Unity 
then being founded in June 1964, this right to be a human being, Malcolm X articulated a 
conception of human rights that departs explicitly from its hegemonic, liberal versions. To this 
day, one of the most powerful assumptions predicating the idea of human rights is an assumption 
that, for all its appeal, contradicts the primary fact upon which Malcolm X declares a right to be 
a human being—namely, his finding that certain human beings are not already human beings, 
that they are in need of a right to be a human being.  Liberal philosophies of human rights cannot 
accommodate such findings, at least not with ease. Instead, they insist, in perfectly circular 
fashion, that all humans beings are born as human beings, and as such, all humans are always 
and already entitled to human rights by the mere fact of their birth and their life.  
But why then do debates about the human rights of the unborn, of the dead and the nearly 
dead, or of others found to display ‘suboptimal’ or ‘underdeveloped’ human qualities—such as 
infants, children, women, the disabled, the mad, and the colonized—why do they raise difficult 
problems for liberal human rights thought? This is the case because while on the one hand, 
liberal articulations of human rights are ‘founded’ on the assumption that one is born a human 
being, and therefore entitled to human rights by birth, on the other hand, such conceptions of 
human rights attach particular qualities to the concept and person of the human.15  
As the philosopher James Griffin, a celebrated contemporary theorist of human rights 
admits, ‘an account of human rights will have to [provide] an explanation of what it is about 
                                                 
15
 While this point has been well established by many scholars (see P Fitzpatrick, Modernism 
and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge UP, 2001)), for my argument, particularly relevant is 
Balibar’s observation that the concept of the human always already bears within it ideas of the 
superhuman and the subhuman. E Balibar, ‘Racism as Universalism’, in Masses, Classes, Ideas 
(Routledge, 1994). 
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being ‘human’ in virtue of which all human beings have these rights’.16 Accordingly, many 
liberal philosophers (whether they admit this explicitly or not) venture to provide a substantive 
account of the human—what one may call a universal anthropology of the human—in order to 
justify both the asserted universality and the specific content of human rights.
17
 For this purpose, 
Griffin develops the notion of personhood to name what all humans allegedly value in their 
‘status as human beings’, which is a human status, he finds, that ‘centers on our being agents—
deliberating, assessing, choosing and acting to make what we see as a good life for ourselves’.18 
However, as Griffin and other liberal theorists have to admit—and this is key—the 
‘“human” cannot there mean … simply being a member of the species homo sapiens’.19 For one, 
Griffin explains this is the case—that the human cannot simply mean a member of the species 
homo sapiens—because although ‘infants, the severely mentally retarded, people in irreversible 
coma are all members of the species’, such persons are not ‘functioning human agents’.20 In other 
words, only those who are proper agents are proper humans and hence the proper holders of 
human rights. My point here is not only to contest the accuracy of liberal philosophers’ account 
of the human, but to demonstrate how the very inscription of particular qualities to human beings 
(be it agency, autonomy, rationality, or whichever other quality is thought to differentiate 
humans from non-humans) helps construct the human as potentially autonomous, developed, 
capable, sane, rational, civilized, and therefore potentially entitled to and capable of enjoying 
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 Cited in R Crips, ‘Two Approaches to Human Rights’, in R Crips (ed.), Griffin on Human 
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human rights. Human rights, in other words, are the potential rights of proper human beings, 
where the proper criterion for establishing one’s human status varies.  
Here, it is relevant to observe as well how anthropologists themselves have contributed to 
the emergence of humanity as a potential to be cultivated, as the potential of particular and 
proper human qualities to develop and be developed. Consider the ‘Declaration on Anthropology 
and Human Rights’ adopted by the American Anthropological Association (AAA) in 1999. The 
preamble of the Declaration asserts that anthropology as a profession is committed to ‘the right 
of people and peoples everywhere to the full realization of their humanity’. The Declaration 
further equates ‘full realization of humanity’ with what it calls a ‘capacity for culture’, which is a 
capacity that needs protection as well as promotion.21 Incidentally, other concepts of human 
flourishing—including Marxist ones—may be thought as parts of the same, even if diverse, 
modern humanist tradition, a tradition which aims to cultivate an unalienated, capable, and 
proper humanity, however understood.22 Strikingly, in these humanist formulations, what all 
humans around the world share is a capacity for humanity: what is common to humans is, 
primarily, a potential humanity that requires cultivation, development and fostering. The point 
about potentiality is important, not only because it allows the modern conception of human rights 
to maintain an appearance of consistency in the face of human beings who are not found to be 
fully entitled to human rights (such as children, slaves, migrants or ‘terrorists’) but also because 
                                                 
21
 American Anthropological Association. ‘Declaration on Anthropology and Human Rights’, 
1999, available at http://humanrights.americananthro.org/1999-statement-on-human-rights/ (last 
visited 3 November 2016).  
22
 On the compatibility of Marxism and the human rights project of cultivating a proper 
humanity, see B Roth, ‘Marxian Insights for the Human Rights Project’, in S Marks (ed.), 
International Law on the Left: Re-Examining Marxist Legacies (Oxford UP, 2008). For a 
powerful refutal of humanism as a legitimate part of the Marxist tradition, see Louis Althusser’s 
‘Marxism and Humanism'. L Althusser, ‘Marxism and Humanism’, in For Marx (Verso, 1996) 
[1964]. 
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it allows human rights to present itself as a project of redemption, as a redemptive political 
project which aims to craft a new, better, more moral and less cruel humanity.
23
 
Still, in its hegemonic, liberal version, human rights are the birth-rights of all humans 
who are born as human beings. It is precisely this loaded assertion that Malcolm X unsettles with 
his declaration of the very need for a right to be a human being, whereby he acknowledges the 
political fact, if I can speak this way, that certain human beings are not already human beings. 
They need the right to be a human being in order to become one. And how will they get it, this 
right to be a human being, and the particular right which follows from that in Malcolm X’s 
formulation, the right to be given the rights of a human being?  
Such a right is what Arendt may have had in mind when she asserted a ‘right to have 
rights’. Nevertheless, what we have in Arendt’s conception of the right to have rights is as much 
a condemnation of the failure of human rights to actualize in practice as a counter-assertion of 
the figure of the citizen against the human, and an endorsement of the framework of citizenship 
as the practicable, even the proper way to enjoy human rights.24 While it may not be a 
misjudgement to argue that after all, both Malcolm X and Hannah Arendt argued for the right to 
be given the rights of a human being, we must nevertheless admit that Arendt’s preference for 
civil rights over human rights was coloured by the republican, as well as the civilizational—and 
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 On human rights as a redemptive project aimed at crafting a new humanity, see Asad (2003); 
Asad (2015).  
24
 Consider this case made by Malcolm X, as if he were responding to Arendt, along with other 
advocates of civil rights over human rights: ‘The American black man is the world’s most 
shameful case of minority oppression. What makes the black man think of himself as only an 
internal United States issue is just a catch-phrase, two words, “civil rights”. How is the black 
man going to get “civil rights” before he wins his human rights? If the American black man will 
start thinking about his human rights, and then start thinking of himself as one of the world’s 
great peoples, he will see that he has a case for the United Nations’. M X & A Haley, The 
Autobiography of Malcolm X (Grove Press, 1996) 274-275. It is notable that in his formulation, 
Malcolm X is appealing to a collectivist and not individualistic notion of human rights as he 
speaks of the minority status of African-Americans as a distinct people.  
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dare I say, racist—patterns of her thought.25 These patterns inform many of her problematic 
assertions in The Origins of Totalitarianism, for example that ‘only savages have nothing more 
to fall back upon than the minimum fact of their human origin’ and that ‘natural rights are 
granted even to savages’,26 where the racialized savage appears as the ontologically lowest 
member of a hierarchically imagined humanity.27  
The savage, in other words, in his ‘abstract nakedness of being nothing but human’28  
becomes a manifestation of bare life as such in the imagination of Arendt—mere human life that 
approaches animality in its divorce from any remnant or achievement of civilization—and 
emerges as the embodiment of all that is not properly political within her philosophical 
framework. It is not a coincidence after all that Arendt chooses to reflect on a particular passage 
from Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness in her own masterpiece, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
a passage where to a white European, precisely the fact that Africans are not not human beings 
becomes the most disturbing fact: ‘No, they were not inhuman. Well you know, that was the 
worst of it—this suspicion of their not being inhuman’, observes Arendt quoting Conrad.29 It is in 
this civilizational, racialized and supremacist framework that both the savage and the animal 
                                                 
25
 It is remarkable that otherwise perceptive students of Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’ fail to take 
seriously (when they do not ignore it all together) the civilizational infliction of Arendt’s 
thinking on this subject. See, for example, E Balibar, ‘(De)Constructing the Human as Human 
Institution: A reflection on the Coherence of Hannah Arendt’s Practical Philosophy’ 74 (3) 
Social Research (2007) 727, 738; A Gundogdu, ‘“Perplexities of the Rights of Man”: Arendt on 
the Aporias of Human Rights’ 11 (1) European Journal of Political Theory (2012) 4, 24. For a 
systematic treatment of Arendt’s ‘anti-black racism’ that goes beyond the common and limited 
focus on Arendt’s ‘Reflections on Little Rock’ (H Arendt, ‘Reflections on Little Rock’ Dissent 
(1959) 45, 56), see K Gines, Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question (Indiana UP, 2014). 
26
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 Gilroy shows how blackness can connote ‘the unadorned inferiority of “bare life” on the 
lowest rungs of humanity’s ontological ladder’ (Gilroy (2005) 37), where the black body appears 
as ultimately biopolitical and racialized mere life, the very embodiment of an ontology of bare 
life. Arendt saw exactly this, it seems to me, in the figure of the savage.  
28
 Arendt (1951) 300. 
29
 Ibid 190. 
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become markers of what Arendt finds despicable in human rights advocacy, when she observes 
with great disdain, for instance, how human rights campaigns between the two world wars 
showed ‘an uncanny similarity in language and composition to that of societies for the 
prevention of cruelty to animals’.30 
Note, moreover, that Arendt’s preference for civil rights as opposed to human rights is 
based on the unstable assumption, nay assertion, that the primary function of the state is the 
protection of its citizens and their rights.
31
 But how and why could Hannah Arendt, writing as a 
denationalized German Jew who could barely escape Nazi Germany assert so? As I have argued 
elsewhere, Arendt was thoroughly invested in normative ideas about ‘the rule of law’ and made 
tortured efforts to save the law as such from the disrepute it had fallen due to the legality of the 
Final Solution.32 In her endeavour to save the name of law, Arendt resorted—though not without 
inconsistencies—to ideas of ‘lawfulness’ predicated on natural law, which corresponded, she 
claimed, to the positive law of ‘normal legal regimes’. Presumably, it was this type of regime, 
certainly the United States, and not what she distinguished as ‘criminal regimes’ that would 
protect human rights as civil rights. 
Malcolm X, on the other hand, as a black citizen of the United States, could not afford 
Arendt’s constitutive assertion—that ‘his’ state’s primary function was the protection of its 
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 This reliance on the state for the protection of rights couples Arendt’s Burkean critique of 
natural rights and leads Balibar to interpret her politics of human rights as ‘an extreme form of 
institutionalism’. Balibar (2007) 729. For an articulation of this ‘institutionalism’, note Arendt’s 
finding that ‘The Rights of Man, after all, had been defined as “inalienable” because they were 
supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment human beings 
lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was 
left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them’. Arendt (1951) 291-292.  
32





citizens and their rights. For this reason, in his inaugurating speech for the Organization of Afro-
American Unity in 1964, he would challenge what is supposed to be the state’s exclusive right 
and responsibility to protect its citizens, and call upon ‘every Afro-American person and every 
Afro-American community in [the United States] to protect its people’. Challenging, in other 
words, the state’s monopoly of a responsibility to protect its people—which is a monopoly that is 
also challenged by the so-called international community today—Malcolm X reminded his 
fellow friends both of their duty and their right to defend, not others, as in the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) doctrine of contemporary international law (which Arendt could conceivably 
support), but themselves.33  
Still, in identical terms with its articulation in international law, Malcolm X framed his 
version of the responsibility to protect doctrine as a necessary yet residual right and duty. As is 
the case with the jurisprudential rationale of the R2P, Malcolm X limited his community’s (not 
the international community’s but the Afro-American community’s) responsibility to protect to 
‘those areas where the government is either unable or unwilling to protect’ the lives of his 
people.34 But there is a second sense in which both versions of the R2P—as a doctrine of just war 
developed by international law and as a doctrine of self-defence articulated by Malcolm X—
mobilize a necessary yet residual right and duty. They both proceed from the prior assumption 
that, in the words of Malcolm X, self-preservation is the first law of nature. ‘Since self-
                                                 
33
 For a critical engagement with the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, see A Orford, 
International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge UP, 2011). I have 
articulated my own interpretation of this dangerous doctrine in Çubukçu (2013). 
34
 While Malcolm X’s emphasis here is on the right to self-defense belonging to the Afro-
American community in the United States, clearly, this right was situated within the larger 
context of his internationalist Pan-Africanism. Note moreover that Malcolm X’s version of ‘the 
international community’ was quite different than the one underpinning contemporary 
invocations of R2P.  
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preservation is the first law of nature, we assert the Afro-American’s right to self-defence’, 
would declare Malcolm X.  
Now this is a law of nature that most modern thinkers from Thomas Hobbes to Hannah 
Arendt, as well as ‘humanist lawyers’ could agree with. In fact, self-defence lies at the 
foundation of modern political thought and the way it has conceptualized the very reason of the 
state, its raison d’état, the rationale for the very existence of the state. The principle of self-
preservation, in other words, grounds the necessity for the state, and its legal and extra-legal 
means for establishing ‘peace and security’. Perhaps needless to say, from the United Nations to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, all violent institutions of international law employ the 
violence of the law in the name of establishing ‘peace and security’, as they too constitute 
themselves on the pillars of this apparently natural need for, this apparently natural necessity of, 
self-preservation. 
In fact, the very concept of necessity—as a modern legal and moral category—is linked 
intimately with the so-called natural law of self-preservation. The way in which Hannah Arendt 
distinguishes between the ‘state crimes’ of what she calls normal legal regimes (such as Israel) 
on the one hand, and the state crimes of criminal regimes (such as Nazi Germany) on the other, 
illustrates well the reasons for this finding. Within Arendt’s differential scheme, in ‘normal legal 
regimes’, necessity dictates the commission of an exceptional criminal act by the state—which is 
a criminality that can neither be judged nor acted on by outside political entities, and this is so 
precisely because the state’s unquestionable right to exist, its natural right to survive, is at stake.35 
The reverse is the case in criminal regimes, Arendt would have us believe, because there, what 
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 H Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin Books, 1994) 
[1965] 291. 
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necessity dictates is not an occasional, exceptional criminal act by the state, but instead an 
exceptional lawfulness.36 
If, for Arendt, state acts by ‘normal legal regimes’ which may be deemed criminal 
according to positive law can nonetheless remain lawful on account of the higher law of self-
preservation, the same is the case for Malcolm X when he reflects on the lawfulness of his own 
call to arms in a legal context where this call could be deemed criminal: 
This is the thing you need to spread the word about among our people wherever you go. 
Never let them be brainwashed into thinking that whenever they take steps to see that 
they are in a position to defend themselves that they are being unlawful. The only time 
you are unlawful is when you break the law. It’s lawful to have something to defend 
yourself.37 
Here, the lawfulness articulated by Malcolm X concerns the principle of self-preservation above 
the particularities of posited law. But as he immediately reminds his audience, what he affirms as 
the lawfulness of self-preservation is already and routinely practiced, within the bounds of 
positive law, by the United States as well as other states around the world. In this context, the 
reason Malcolm X has to make an appeal to the natural law of self-preservation is simply that he 
is not the leader of a state, but of a political movement unable to mobilize positive law for the 
purposes of its self-defence. 
All of this demonstrates that although they may ultimately envision different political 
arrangements as the best, Hannah Arendt and Malcolm X share a fundamental belief that colours 
their approach to the question of human rights. This is the principle of survival and its correlate, 
the right to self-defence, by any means necessary, including violent ones, legal or otherwise. But 
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whereas Arendt may find in violence, as in human rights, an anti-political mantle38 except when 
employed by ‘normal legal regimes’, Malcolm X perceives in violence a method intimately 
linked with the goal of ensuring the very survival of his community as human beings. If, 
however, the necessity of self-preservation, if the necessity of survival underwrites the violence 
of the law and its humane principles—whether in Israel, Harlem, or the United Nations Security 
Council—we may still wish to ask what accounts for the force of this necessity and its hold over 
our political imagination. 
Part II 
The Essence of Humanity 
In the tradition of European humanism, the constitution of humanity as a collective 
subject—for whom universal benevolence is to be practiced and a grand loyalty exercised—is 
partly founded upon humanity’s difference from and superiority over animality.39 Hence, the 
orbit of the ‘universal solidarity’ which humanism draws excludes, at the outset, the animal. 
While humanist arguments are often made for the extension of care and solidarity to animals, it 
is their degree of similarity to humans—whether measured through animals’ capacity to feel 
pleasure or pain or their intelligence—that grounds such pleas for the ‘humane’ treatment of 
animals.40 Significantly, these arguments leave intact the hierarchical positioning of the human 
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above the animal, while they also order different animal species hierarchically according to their 
various degrees of proximity to what is taken to be the essence of humanity.
41
 But that is not all.  
Those subjects effectively banned from the category of the human—and hence the 
enjoyment of the prerogatives of the human status—have also included subjects who were at 
once acknowledged to be parts of humanity as a species. If, in the sense of the species, 
‘humanity was born and nurtured in the crucible of early modern conquest and settler 
colonialism’,42 against familiar interpretations based on the concepts of dehumanization43 and 
exclusion, I would like to argue that those who could not fully enjoy the prerogatives of being 
human—be it women or the colonized, slaves or children—were deprived of this enjoyment not 
only when they were excluded from the category of the human, but when they were included 
within it as potential humans.
44
  
In other words, it was (and is) their categorical inclusion in the order of humanity within 
an evolutionary framework that recognizes their potential to become proper humans (understood 
here as Christian, there as civilized, mature, moral, or rational) that has enabled the establishment 
of hierarchies amongst subjects with different entitlements to enjoy the human prerogative. As 
Antony Anghie45 demonstrates, the celebrated humanist jurist Vitoria justified the Spanish 
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colonization of the Americas precisely by acknowledging the rationality, that is, the perfectibility 
and “human potential” of the native. 46. In the case of British rule over India, to give another 
example, what Partha Chatterjee calls the two strategies of empire—the pedagogy of violence 
and the pedagogy of culture—were employed over the colonized in order to bring her closer to 
the order of proper humanity, or what Chatterjee prefers to call ‘the norm’.47 Here, as elsewhere, 
pedagogical violence was to be received by insufficiently proper humans—who lacked 
Christianity, civilization, culture, rationality, or the correct ideology—as a gift of love, a violent, 
yet redemptive and liberatory love for the development of (their) humanity. 
That the modern concept of humanity can simultaneously designate a collective subject to 
be redeemed, liberated, defended, and developed through various ethico-political projects on the 
one hand, and an apparently self-evident, all-embracing human species on the other hand—that 
duality is enabled by the common assumption that members of humanity share a singular essence. 
And this duality appears beyond the liberal tradition, when we consider, for example, the Marxist 
concept of alienation48 and its development by anticolonial thought as exemplified by Frantz 
Fanon’s call for disalienation, by which he meant the ‘the unmaking of racialized bodies and 
their restoration to properly human modes of being in the world’.49 Here, as elsewhere, humanity 
appears at once as a fact (because the human status of the racialized body is not in question), as 
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much as an ideal (because the colonized is not living a properly human life). Revealing the full 
ambition of his anti-colonial thought, when addressing his comrades, Fanon would go as far as to 
demand that ‘we ought to uplift the people… we must … change them, and make them into 
human beings’.50 To make the colonized into human beings—how different was this call from the 
colonial mission of bourgeois humanism we might still ask, which, according to Fanon himself, 
managed ‘to appear logical in its own eyes by inviting the sub-men to become human?’51 And in 
Fanon’s project of making humans, of turning the colonized into human beings, how did the role 
of violence differ from that which the colonizer assigned to it—beyond, that is, a change in the 
subject who was to be in charge of it?52  
Besides the idea of a singular human essence, the assertion that humanity shares a 
common human experience also facilitates the duality I wish to elucidate. As Talal Asad 
observes, the idea of a common human experience—the human experience—emerged among 
writers in nineteenth century England and like the idea of the human essence, it began to refer, 
en masse, to lives of individuals regardless of their ‘accidental’ particularities53 such as their class, 
race, culture, gender and even times. As such, the idea of a secularized human experience 
‘became a way of talking about the essence of humanity’, a human essence that was seen at once 
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as universal and historical.54 In this way, Asad further argues, the very notion of the human 
experience helped translate natural law as divinely inscribed morality ‘into a secular device for 
relating the plurality of the world’s customs to the universality of transcendent law’.55  
I would like to frame this slightly differently: on the one hand, the idea of humanity’s 
universal essence grounds the very applicability of universal law to humanity as a collective 
subject. At once, what is understood to be humanity’s historically contingent, varying 
constitution—the notion of a historical human essence—allows diverse human practices various 
degrees of alignment with universal law, and enables the differential placement of particular 
human practices along universal standards of ‘progress’.  In any case, the idea of the human 
essence—whether understood universally, historically, or through a combination of the two—
remains central to the idea of humanity as a collective subject, be it humanity ‘as the hero of a 
narrative in which liberty continually expands’56 or humanity as the universal victim of a 
particular crime.57 Without the idea of the human essence, humanism and humanist projects of 
evolution and revolution could not make much sense of humanity: neither as a species, nor as a 
collective subject to be cultivated, redeemed, liberated, or defended.  
 
Part III 
Taking the Risk of Humanity 
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Much has accumulated against humanity, against those who arrogate themselves to be 
acting on its behalf: at least as much death and destruction as beauty, creativity, solidarity.
58
 Still, 
humanity’s well-intentioned advocates are many. But is the concept of humanity necessarily, 
intrinsically, or ‘really’ as harmless as its passionate advocates claim? And if humanity is an all-
inclusive concept that excludes the exclusion of any human being, why is the history of 
humanity—as concept, ideal, and political subject—full of exclusions from its ranks, chaining 
together one subhuman to another?  
I speak of subhumanity here rather than ‘inhumanity’ or ‘dehumanization’ for a number 
of reasons. First, positing what is essentially the problem of equality among human beings as one 
of ‘inhumanity’ or ‘dehumanization’ contributes to a tradition of thought according to which 
racism, for example, is rooted in exclusion from the order of humanity. According to this line of 
thinking, ‘humanization’ would be a solution to racism because it would facilitate the inclusion 
of those subjected to racism within the category of the human and ‘the family of humanity’ (as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls it). In other words, when various propagations 
of hierarchy, including racism and sexism, are diagnosed as dehumanization, ‘humanization’59 
(whatever that may involve) is quickly asserted as the means to equality among human beings.  
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But this tradition of thinking ignores the fact that the ideal of humanity and its conceptual 
and practical history have also involved the withdrawal of solidarity and the denial of equality to 
certain human beings whose humanity, as membership in a species, was nevertheless granted. 
This fact is what Sartre recognizes in his preface to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, when he 
translates what the colonized are saying to Europeans: ‘Your humanism claims we are at one 
with the rest of humanity, but your racist methods set us apart’.60 Given the systematic nature of 
methods by which solidarity has been withdrawn and equality denied to certain human beings 
whose humanity as membership in a species has nevertheless been granted, what accounts for the 
faith that as concept, ideal, or practice, a humanity that does not discriminate amongst its ranks is 
possible? Perhaps more importantly, what accounts for the very desire for humanity as a 
collective subject when it introduces hierarchies within and between ‘species’? 
Thinking against humanity is not thinking against solidarity or equality, nor is it refusing 
to act for a justice without borders. Thinking against humanity affirms the need for creating a 
common ground and horizon of political action in terms of what we want and do not want to see 
happen on this earth, whoever this ‘we’ may be, when certainly, we are not unified as one 
humanity. Would such a unified humanity be desirable in the first place: should solidarity be 
extended to all human beings regardless of their particular deeds and dreams? And if, as I have 
argued, violence is central and hierarchy is intrinsic to the political and ethical operations of 
humanity—hierarchies between proper humans and improper ones, however defined; hierarchies 
between fully developed humans and those not yet fully developed, however understood; 
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hierarchies between humans and non-humans—why should the grounds of our acting together, 
with or without borders, be given by this concept of ‘humankind’?61  
What is more, when practicing principles of equality and solidarity across species, this 
we could do without claiming membership in that part of humanity, proper humanity, which 
becomes proper at the expense of others who remain not properly human. Instead, we could 
constitute, when acting in concert, measures of justice that we want to live by, humans and non-
humans alike, and build the political and ethical communities that we wish to nurture and 
defend—with some means and not unnecessary others.62 
We cannot afford to talk carelessly about universal solidarity with humanity as if 
humanity were a self-evident, innocent community to be in solidarity with. On the contrary, what 
Hannah Arendt observed some fifty years ago may still the case: ‘The idealism of the humanist 
tradition of Enlightenment and its concept of mankind look like reckless optimism in the light of 
present realities’.63 Perhaps, it is the case that ‘the risk of casual talk about humanity’ can be 
sanctioned, but as Paul Gilroy argues through Du Bois, only if  ‘the corrosive power of the 
broken world’s racial order can be addressed seriously and consistently’, once, that is, our 
underestimation of ‘how much work needs to be done in order to repair and rework facile notions 
of human fellowship and solidarity’ ceases to exist.64 Taking the risk of talking about humanity, 
if it is not going to be reckless, requires a preparedness to examine seriously and 
unapologetically the violent legacies of humanism, including its anti-colonial and anti-racist 
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kinds. And who will have the temerity to do that by sacrificing the ‘absolutist or naturalized 
status’ of the human and her rights?65 Once that is attempted, perhaps then we could begin to 
honour ‘the dark side’ of humanity before proceeding proudly, almost perversely, to call people 
to humanity’s name, to the violent love and law of humanity.  
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